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SQEezing the jurisprudence out of the SRA’s super exam: the SQE’s Bleak Legal 
Realism and the rejection of law’s multimodal truth
Luke Mason
ABSTRACT
This article considers the nature of legal knowledge and legal truth, and the ability of certain 
forms of examination to appropriately assess them. It thereby provides a critical theoretical 
framework to understand the Solicitor’s Qualifying Exam (SQE), the proposed centralised 
qualifying test to become a solicitor in England and Wales. In particular, it considers the 
multiple-choice aspect of the so-called SQE1, which purports to test certain core areas of 
legal knowledge. The author asserts that SQE1 embodies a thoroughly impoverished vision 
of law, which he labels ‘Bleak Legal Realism’, where prospective students are reduced to 
producing brute predictions of judicial outcomes. The author argues that while multiple-
choice examinations are capable of testing various forms of knowledge and reasoning, they 
are inappropriate in legal contexts due to legal propositions’ lack of bivalence, that is they 
cannot simply be said to be either true or false. Examining the nature of legal truth, both in 
the context of the general philosophy of law and the broader philosophy of truth, the author 
argues that legal truth is ultimately characterised by its ‘multimodality’, that is that it rests 
upon various qualified ‘modes’ of reasoning which, in turn, justify any given legal proposition. 
Because legal truth is constituted by these justificatory modes, any attempt to test legal 
knowledge without requiring a demonstration of such justificatory multimodality will fail to 
accurately test legal knowledge, seriously compromising the SQE’s utility and legitimacy.
KEYWORDS: Legal Education, SQE, Multimodality, Multiple Choice Exams, Legal Truth
1. Introduction
The Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA), the regulatory body for the large part of the legal 
profession in England and Wales,11 The organisation was established by the Legal Services 
Act 2007, which also sets out its regulatory competences and objectives.View all notes has 
recently proposed a significant change to the way in which people qualify to practise as 
solicitors in that jurisdiction. This consists of a two-stage centralised assessment, the 
Solicitors Qualifying Exam (SQE), which has become known in some quarters as the “super 
exam”.22 For details of the nature and goals of this reform, see the contribution to this issue 
by the regulators, in particular the section authored by Julie Brannan of the SRA.View all 
notes This paper focuses on one particularly controversial aspect of that change, that is the 
introduction of a multiple-choice examination, which seeks to assess whether candidates 
possess sufficient knowledge about relevant areas of law to practise (the so-called SQE1). 
This change is both revolutionary and controversial for many reasons. This paper however 
will consider perhaps the most fundamental question in this regard, albeit one which is 
remarkably neglected within the limited work which exists on the SQE,33 For excellent 
analysis of the process which led to the SQE’s introduction, and its potential impact, see 
Elaine Hall, “Notes on the SRA Report of the Consultation on the Solicitors Qualifying Exam: 
‘Comment Is Free, but Facts Are Sacred’” (2017) 51 The Law Teacher 364; Eileen Fry and 
Richard Wakeford, “Can We Really Have Confidence in a Centralised Solicitors Qualifying 
Exam? The Example of the Qualified Lawyers Transfer Scheme” (2017) 51 The Law 
Teacher 98.View all notes namely whether and how such an assessment is capable of 
testing legal knowledge. What follows is therefore an exercise in legal theory, in that it posits 
an account of what makes legal statements true or valid. It is emphatically argued that 
SQE1, as envisaged by the SRA, embodies a thoroughly impoverished, and indeed largely 
incoherent, vision of law, termed within this paper “Bleak Legal Realism”, which 
fundamentally misunderstands how legal truths are created or identified. Due to 
the multimodal and justificatory nature of legal reason, there is no brute form of bivalence 
within legal propositions or putative legal knowledge; legal propositions cannot be said to be 
either “true” or “false” in a simplistic manner, which is what a multiple-choice-type 
examination requires in order to be fit for purpose in this context.
While multiple-choice assessments are also thought to be problematic in other important 
respects, not considered directly in this paper, they are reliable in examining many forms of 
knowledge, even in sophisticated or “deep” ways, but only in certain “types” of epistemic 
contexts. Broadly speaking, these are when truth in a particular field is constituted by, on the 
one hand, its immanence or coherence, or, on the other hand, its correspondence with 
certain external truth conditions. It is appropriate therefore to areas which are characterised 
by a unified, coherent epistemology, and those which are characterised by an identifiable 
external ontology. Legal truth is not exclusively characterised by either of these qualities. 
The multimodal nature of legal reasoning means that even where legal reason incorporates 
aspects which resemble such elements, these are merely a few amongst many modes of 
justificatory argument which lead to valid legal propositions. More precisely, the nature of law 
and the validity of legal propositions are contested to the extent that there are numerous 
competing modes which stipulate different accounts of internal coherence and external truth 
conditions.
Upon deeper analysis, legal truth is different to immanent or correspondent forms of truth 
due to the fact that legal truth is constituted by the modes of argument which lead to the 
valid proposition. This form of modal constructivism means that a multiple-choice 
assessment is incapable of reliably testing legal knowledge. This does not mean, of course, 
that such an examination is devoid of all value: it must, after all, be testing something, and 
must contain its own innate account of what constitutes legal truth. It is concluded that the 
SQE1 embodies a form of Bleak Legal Realism, in which legal knowledge is reduced to the 
ability to predict adjudicatory outcomes. This is a grave problem for three reasons. Firstly, it 
does great violence to the multimodal nature of legal knowledge, reflecting instead a 
simplified and simplistic conception of legal knowledge, reflecting none of the reasoning 
which itself constitutes the proposition being asserted. Secondly, and even more worryingly, 
this approach to the testing of legal knowledge is incoherent. While legal realism as a broad 
intellectual movement brought great sophistication to legal knowledge and practice during 
the twentieth century, in its most simplistic form, that found in the SQE1, it is simply 
incoherent: legal truth cannot be a prediction of legal reasoning, when it is this reasoning 
itself which generates that legal truth.44 This argument of course echoes that famously found 
in Hart’s reductio ad absurdum of this same form of legal realism, found in HLA Hart, The 
Concept of Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) ch 7.View all notes This method of 
testing legal knowledge through what is effectively the brute prediction of legal outcomes is 
being introduced just as this aspect of legal practice is on the cusp of being entirely taken 
over by the superior ability of artificial intelligence and algorithms to perform this very job. 
Thirdly, this assessment, if it comes to have a dominant effect on the way in which law is 
taught and studied more generally in England and Wales, will have an impact not only on the 
quality of students and the ability of the examination to identify those who are capable of 
generating legally valid propositions. Due to the law’s constructivist nature, the way in which 
people think about the law has a direct impact on the law itself: its epistemology and 
ontology are directly and symbiotically linked. Reducing lawyers’ thinking to a prediction of 
their own profession’s outcomes will have a detrimental impact on the quality and form of 
legal reasoning in general, and therefore on the quality of both the performance of those 
exercising legal services and the content and operation of the law itself. If the legal 
profession resists this impact, it will be due to the irrelevance of the exam to the broader 
education, training and selection of future lawyers.
2. The theory of law and legal education
What follows is a theoretical discussion about the relationship between legal philosophy and 
the SQE. However, this paper is not about the role of legal scholarship within legal 
education, nor the role of legal study as a liberal arts degree. Nor is it about the relationship 
between “academic” and “professional” legal education.55 On these questions, see the 
contribution of Anthony Bradney to this issue, and, generally, William Twining, Law in 
Context: Enlarging a Discipline (Clarendon Press 1997); William Twining, Blackstone’s 
Tower: The English Law School (Stevens 1994).View all notes It is about the nature of law, 
or, more precisely, of legal knowledge. This paper explores what it might mean to say that a 
proposition of law is true, correct or valid, and how we might therefore appropriately test 
someone’s ability to identify and/or construct such propositions. For the purposes of the 
present discussion, no position will be adopted by the author regarding whether the validity 
of legal propositions should be the sole or central component of legal education and training. 
Legal education, training, and legal scholarship more broadly, can and do include various 
other aspects, such as the social and cultural significance and genesis of law, its history, its 
professional usage, and so on. However, most legal education does present such questions 
as the cornerstone of its curriculum,66 The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, 
“Subject Benchmark Statement: Law” (QAA 2015) 6. “The study of law involves the 
acquisition of legal knowledge.”View all notesor require demonstrable knowledge of it to 
pass on to a second “vocational” stage of training.77 The Law Society and the General 
Council of the Bar, “Joint Statement on the Academic Stage of Training” (1999) 
<www.sra.org.uk/students/academic-stage-joint-statement-bsb-law-society.page> accessed 
30 September 2018.View all notes
At present the solicitors’ profession in England and Wales requires that prospective solicitors 
demonstrate a sufficient knowledge of the law through a “qualifying law degree”, or 
equivalent, which covers the so-called Foundations of Legal Knowledge. The SRA’s “Joint 
Statement”88 ibid.View all notes agreed with the General Council of the Bar, which regulates 
this matter, is agnostic regarding what constitutes knowledge in these areas or how such 
knowledge is assessed.99 Bar Standards Board and Solicitors Regulation Authority, 
“Academic Stage Handbook” (BSB, SRA 2014).View all notes The SRA’s proposals for a 
central SQE replace this “academic stage” of relatively unprescribed legal knowledge with an 
alternative model. SQE1 proposes to assess legal knowledge in a very specific way, moving 
from the extreme agnosticism of the past to a sudden and fervent evangelism of the newly 
converted in measuring it in a new, innovative and very specific way. The proposed form of 
this stage of the centralised SQE is a multiple-choice examination in which candidates must 
select the best single answer of a range of options to questions about selected areas of law. 
These selected areas are, loosely, a combination of the Foundations of Legal Knowledge 
and those fields of law deemed important for “Day One Outcomes”1010 SRA Education and 
Training Committee, “Day One Outcomes” (Version 2, SRA 2007).View all notes in the 
“reserved activities”, that is the specific legal services which solicitors are entitled to carry 
out, and which fall therefore under the SRA’s regulatory function.1111 Legal Services Act 
2007. These are currently the administration of oaths, advocacy, conveyancing, litigation, 
notarial activities and probate activities.View all notes Leaving aside the important and 
contested issue of whether these fields are the appropriate “Foundations” of Legal 
Knowledge, either in general or for a prospective solicitor, this change in the SRA’s 
approach to qualification has a radical effect. The SRA has come to take a specific stance 
regarding the nature of legal knowledge and the nature of legal truth: of how we know things 
about law and how we test this knowledge. However, reading the SRA’s accompanying 
literature to its original consultation process and subsequent proposals, there is no 
discussion about the nature of law or how these views on this matter might impact upon how 
one can or cannot test the truthfulness or validity of legal propositions.1212 Solicitors 
Regulation Authority, “A New Route to Qualification: The Solicitors Qualifying Examination 
(SQE): Summary of Reponses and Our Decision on Next Steps” (SRA 2017).View all 
notes It is the assertion of this author in this paper that this has led to an entirely 
inappropriate form of assessment for legal knowledge. SQE1 is simply incapable of carrying 
out the role which the SRA assigns to it unless one subscribes to a rather implausible 
understanding of the nature of law.
A brief word, first of all, on the necessity of this discussion. This is a thesis regarding the 
nature of law, and therefore is a work of legal philosophy. It is not however a defence, or 
even a discussion, of the place of the study of legal philosophy within legal education.1313 On 
this question see Charles Sampford and Hugh Breakey, Law, Lawyering and Legal 
Education: Building an Ethical Profession in a Globalizing World(Routledge 2017), in 
particular ch 3.View all notes However, when one assesses a student’s ability to identify, 
construct or apply valid legal propositions, there is, explicitly or implicitly, a theory of 
law which is embodied within the mechanisms of assessment. That is to say, one must have 
an understanding of the epistemic models which generate or test the validity of certain 
propositions, or alternatively, an understanding of the ontologically extant “things in the 
world” which any such proposition must refer to in order to be correct. This, it is hoped, is not 
a particularly controversial statement. All fields of knowledge and disciplines of science 
possess their own methodologies and epistemologies. When one asks the question of the 
nature of those structures, and their object of study, one is engaging in the philosophy of that 
field. In law, this question is particularly prominent compared to certain other areas of 
knowledge, study and practice because of the law’s contested nature. More particularly, and 
pertinently for the purposes of this paper, what characterises the disagreements within 
modern Western legal philosophy is profound disagreement about what characterises a valid 
legal proposition.1414 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Belknap Press 1986) in particular chs 1 
and 2; Dennis Patterson, Law and Truth (Oxford University Press 1999).View all notes In 
other words, behind both the aggressive posturing and nuanced development of different 
schools of legal theory over the past century or so lies a debate about how one correctly 
identifies the content of the law. Some of the more prominent accounts of such matters are 
of course well known. Such accounts vary quite dramatically: law as rooted in empirically 
observable social practice constituting rules which then, in turn, identify other rules of various 
kinds which constitute legal content;1515 Hart (n 4).View all notes law as ultimately resting, in 
its truest form, on the requirements of moral judgment or justice;1616 John Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights(Clarendon Press 1982).View all notes law as a practice of 
interpretation in which past legal decisions are reinterpreted in line with their best moral 
justification;1717 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 14).View all notes law as essentially an empirical 
question of adjudication, in which fundamentally indeterminate legal grounds are given 
meaning through their application;1818 Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on 
American Legal Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy (Oxford University Press 
2007).View all notes law as a community of interpretive practice;1919 Stanley Eugene Fish, Is 
There a Text in this Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Harvard University 
Press 1980).View all notes law as an internal system of logical coherence.2020 Ernest J 
Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford University Press 2012).View all notes This list 
could be extended in various ways. In particular, this list does not include those numerous 
accounts which see law as largely or entirely dependent on some other form of knowledge or 
social practice.2121 See, variously, the ideas contained in Richard A Posner, “The Law and 
Economics Movement” (1987) 77 The American Economic Review 1; Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology(International Publishers Co 1970); Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, “The Critical Legal Studies Movement” (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 
561.View all notes Broadly speaking, these disagreements are characterised by the question 
of how legal truths are generated or located, and to what extent such legal epistemology can 
be said to be autonomous, that is separate from other forms of thinking or knowledge, such 
as morality, sociology or economics.
Such questions often strike those interested in putatively “practical” approaches to law as 
somehow abstract or ethereal, which might be interesting or important in some way, but 
largely irrelevant to working out what the law says in a particular field, which is what real, 
that is to say practising, lawyers need to know. Such opinions, to the extent that they are 
indeed held, are entirely misconceived.2222 This sentiment is most famously and most 
powerfully expressed by Keynes:“The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both 
when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly 
understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to 
be quite exempt from any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct 
economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from 
some academic scribbler of a few years back.”John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money (Macmillan 1936) 383.View all notes While questions of 
the grounds of law,2323 Patterson (n 14) 171.View all notes such as whether a particular 
statute is in force, do not require such “theoretical” accounts in order to generate answers, 
the question of whether a particular statute should apply in a certain circumstance can only 
be answered through what one considers to be a correct way of arriving at the correct 
content of law in general.2424 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 14) 90. Dworkin expresses Keynes’ 
famous remark in the legal context, and with even more force:“Any practical legal argument, 
no matter how detailed and limited, assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence 
offers, and when rival foundations compete, a legal argument assumes one and rejects 
others. So any judge’s opinion is itself a piece of legal philosophy. […] Jurisprudence is the 
general part of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law.”View all notes The 
briefest of surveys in this section has shown that questions of identification of correct legal 
propositions are extremely contested, perhaps infinitely so. Indeed, this contested nature is 
currently reflected in the regulatory agnosticism and openness to different approaches found 
within the loose framework which governs and informs the teaching and examination of law 
in England and Wales. As well as the lack of prescriptive requirements regarding the 
Foundations of Legal Knowledge in the Joint Statement, discussed above, there is also the 
supreme epistemic agnosticism of the Subject Benchmark Statement for law issued by the 
Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA).2525 The Quality Assurance Agency 
for Higher Education (n 6) 6. Section 1.2 of that document explicitly states:“The study of law 
exposes students to a wide range of methods and techniques, some of which are specific to 
the discipline but some of which are drawn from the humanities and social sciences. The 
emphasis placed on the range and type of methods varies between law schools. […] The 
common denominator is the requirement on the student to apply their understanding of legal 
principles, rules, doctrine, skills and values. There are many ways of achieving this and 
different higher education providers will choose different approaches.”View all notes While 
the Statement asserts that the study of law covered under its remit is 
an academic matter,2626 ibid (emphasis added).View all notes it would be hard to understand 
its reference to the requirement that students develop “an ability to recognise ambiguity and 
deal with uncertainty in law”2727 ibid 9.View all notes as anything other than a reference to 
disagreement about the content, interpretation and application of the law and how one 
properly goes about resolving such matters. It is a reference not to questions 
of academic doubt, but rather to the academic study of legal questions of doubt. It is indeed 
from such questions of doubt that the viability of such diverse perspectives on legal truth 
emerge. As Ronald Dworkin famously argues, legal reasoning and practice are 
characterised primarily by disagreement,2828 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 14) 6–7.View all 
notes and this in the context of his holistic account of legal content which defends the idea of 
a single correct legal answer to any given legal question. How lawyers resolve such 
disagreements and arrive at conclusions regarding the content of the law is of course the 
determinant of what counts as truth in law. In an almost embarrassed manner, legal 
education in England and Wales, emerging from the shadows and into respectable areas of 
scholarship and study only during the twentieth century,2929 Twining, Blackstone’s Tower (n 
5).View all notes has therefore been characterised by no single clearly articulated method or 
epistemology. Certain law schools have emerged and grown with different signature 
approaches to legal learning, and these have added to the wealth of legal scholarship and 
education. Conversely, many English and Welsh law schools have probably continued rather 
unreflectingly, through a process of autopoietic curriculum and assessment regeneration, or 
perhaps, on the part of some, due to the misapprehension that a far greater level of 
regulation of their curriculum exists than is in fact the case. No regulatory or overseeing body 
has ever attempted to prescribe the nature of legal truth within legal study in England and 
Wales. This has perhaps led to the impression on the part of many practitioners of legal 
education, in particular of professional legal education, that there is no link between legal 
theory and legal education. In reality, there has simply been no regulation of that link. Every 
act of legal education embodies a theory of law.
3. Multiple-choice tests and the nature of legal truth: bivalence and multimodality
Whether a multiple-choice-type assessment is capable of properly assessing knowledge 
depends, of course, on the type of knowledge to be assessed. Building on the discussion in 
the preceding paragraphs, the present section analyses the viability of assessing legal 
knowledge in such a way. It builds a picture of legal truth which seeks to make sense of the 
disagreements which exist within accounts of a “general jurisprudence” on the nature of law. 
It will be argued that legal reasoning is characterised by a specifically multimodal form of 
justificatory reasoning, making multiple-choice examinations singularly unsuitable for 
assessing legal knowledge.
There exists a wealth of literature on multiple-choice questions (MCQs) as a form of 
assessment within higher education3030 Richard F Burton, “Quantifying the Effects of Chance 
in Multiple Choice and True/False Tests: Question Selection and Guessing of Answers” 
(2001) 26 Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education 41; Paul McCoubrie, “Improving the 
Fairness of Multiple-Choice Questions: A Literature Review” (2004) 26 Medical Teacher 
709.View all notes and elsewhere.3131 For instance, Leonard B Bliss, “A Test of Lord’s 
Assumption Regarding Examinee Guessing Behavior on Multiple-Choice Tests Using 
Elementary School Students” (1980) 17 Journal of Educational Measurement 147.View all 
notes This work is found in both generalist pedagogical science as well as the scholarly 
research of specific disciplines and their teaching. In law, however, there is very little work 
on this matter, either in England and Wales or elsewhere. However, the more general 
research covers all manner of issues, regarding the reliability of MCQs,3232 McCoubrie (n 
30); Mark G Simkin and William L Kuechler, “Multiple-Choice Tests and Student 
Understanding: What Is the Connection?” (2005) 3 Decision Sciences Journal of Innovative 
Education 73; Burton (n 30).View all notes their impact on questions of equality and 
discrimination,3333 Gershon Ben-Shakhar and Yakov Sinai, “Gender Differences in Multiple-
Choice Tests: The Role of Differential Guessing Tendencies” (1991) 28 Journal of 
Educational Measurement 23.View all notes their vulnerability to plagiarism and other forms 
of cheating,3434 Robert B Frary and others, “Indices of Cheating on Multiple-Choice Tests” 
(1977) 2 Journal of Educational Statistics 235.View all notes and so on. Predominantly, 
however, the work tends to question the effectiveness of MCQs in examining “deep” forms of 
knowledge within different disciplines.3535 Jennifer L Momsen and others, “Just the Facts? 
Introductory Undergraduate Biology Courses Focus on Low-Level Cognitive Skills” (2010) 9 
LSE 435; Paula P Lemons and others, “Questions for Assessing Higher-Order Cognitive 
Skills: It’s Not Just Bloom’s” (2013) 12 LSE 47; Stephen Buckles and John J Siegfried, 
“Using Multiple-Choice Questions to Evaluate In-Depth Learning of Economics” (2006) 37 
The Journal of Economic Education 48.View all notes Much work looks at the differences 
between MCQs and what are often termed in the pedagogical literature “constructed 
responses”, that is long-form narrative or prose-based answers in which the student 
constructs their own answer in response to a more or less open question, including 
explanation, justification and references where appropriate, rather than selecting the most 
appropriate answer(s) from a closed selection.3636 William E Becker and Carol Johnston, 
“The Relationship between Multiple Choice and Essay Response Questions in Assessing 
Economics Understanding” (1999) 75 Economic Record 348; Nixon Chan and Peter E 
Kennedy, “Are Multiple-Choice Exams Easier for Economics Students? A Comparison of 
Multiple-Choice and ‘Equivalent’ Constructed-Response Exam Questions” (2002) 68 
Southern Economic Journal 957.View all notes There are a range of conclusions drawn in 
these papers, and there is no general consensus in this regard. However, there is a general 
tendency for deeper reflection on such matters through such research to lead to broader 
considerations of the different orders of knowledge within a given field, and the difficulty in 
assessing complex forms of knowledge with either single or multiple best answer-based 
MCQs.3737 Lemons and others (n 35); Buckles and Siegfried (n 35).View all notes This 
general literature cannot therefore give us any form of transdisciplinary guidance regarding 
the suitability of MCQs in general, except for the general observation that higher forms of 
knowledge within a particular field require more intricately constructed questions, which take 
into account the nature of that complexity. There is nothing inherently “wrong” with MCQs, 
even in the testing of the “deep knowledge”, which the Legal Education and Training Review 
(LETR),3838 Julian Webb and others, “Setting Standards: The Future of Legal Services 
Education and Training Regulation in England and Wales” (Legal Education and Training 
Review 2013).View all notes an evaluation of legal education in England and Wales 
commissioned by the SRA and others and published in 2013, emphasised as crucial in the 
training of lawyers moving forwards.
The present work seeks to make a different contribution to the literature on MCQs, however, 
that is on their appropriateness for evaluating only certain types of “truth” or correct answer. 
MCQs, in particular the single best answer-type proposed by the SRA for SQE1, are 
potentially appropriate as a method of assessment when the “truth” of a particular field can 
be understood as bivalent, that is to say where propositions may possess only two states, 
true or false.3939 John McDowell, “Truth-Conditions, Bivalence, and Verification” in G Evans 
and J McDowell (eds), Truth and Meaning (Clarendon Press 1976); Kenneth F Rogerson, 
“Truth, Bivalence, and Realism” (1994) 43 Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 
43.View all notes In such circumstances, regardless of the potential complexity of 
constructing questions to test such matters, MCQs are a viable form of assessment, 
although this is not to take any position regarding whether they are a more or less desirable 
method of assessment than any other competitor model. Within formal logic, the falsehood 
of the universality of the so-called law of bivalence of all semantic constructions, found within 
classical forms of logic,4040 On this question generally see Paul Tomassi, Logic (Psychology 
Press 1999) 123–25.View all notes has been overcome though the use of a third broad 
category for those propositions which have yet to be determined as either true or 
false.4141 Jan Łukasiewicz, “On Three-Valued Logic” in Selected Works (Studies in Logic and 
the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland 1970) 87–89.View all notes Of course, 
matters of classical or formal logic do not necessarily tell us anything directly about legal 
knowledge, given law’s status as a socially constructed institution, however the notion of 
bivalence and its transcendence within formal and other accounts of logic are instructive in 
numerous ways. They point us in the direction of an analysis of legal propositions which can 
test the suitability of MCQs. What, therefore, is the nature of the truth of legal propositions?
Let us move beyond the restraining confines of formal logic and consider more generally the 
nature of truth, that is what it is to say that a proposition is true or correct. Truth is one of the 
longest standing questions in the canon of Western philosophy, and it remains one of the 
most central and important, in particular due to its relationship with the equally central 
questions of knowledge, language and ontology.4242 Alexis G Burgess and John P 
Burgess, Truth(Princeton University Press 2011).View all notes Broadly speaking, 
philosophical accounts of the nature of truth, which are not sceptical about the very concept 
and generally embrace bivalence, can be categorised into two groups. There are those 
accounts of truth which see propositions as true when they refer to objectively extant facts in 
the world. Things are true on this view when they can be safely said to correspond to things 
or states of affairs which exist. These accounts can be broadly grouped together as 
“correspondence” theories of truth, where propositions are true where they correspond to 
an ontology outside one’s understanding or perception of it.4343 Marian Alexander 
David, Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth(Oxford 
University Press 1994); Gerald Vision, Veritas: The Correspondence Theory and Its 
Critics(MIT Press 2009).View all notes On the other hand, there are accounts which reject 
such a vision, seeing truth as a more holistic question not of identity with facts in the world 
but rather with other matters of understanding. Such accounts therefore generally 
understand propositions as true when they fit with our surrounding knowledge in that area. 
These can be labelled coherence theories of truth, in that statements are true when 
they cohere with our broader understanding of things.4444 Ralph Charles Sutherland 
Walker, The Coherence Theory of Truth: Realism, Anti-Realism, Idealism(International 
Library of Philosophy, Routledge 1989).View all notes Such theories therefore see truth as a 
broadly epistemic question rather than a metaphysical or ontological one. If we can find a 
plausible account of law and the validity of legal propositions which seems to fit with one of 
these accounts of truth, MCQs remain a theoretically plausible form of assessment for legal 
knowledge.
How therefore do we generate valid answers regarding legal propositions? There of course 
exist numerous accounts which are entirely sceptical about any such enterprise within law, 
which one might label the “no right answer thesis”. Elements of such an account are found 
within strands of the legal realist tradition, or at least those parts of it which focus on the 
indeterminacy of legal standards, and also within elements of the broader critical legal 
studies movement, in particular those which adopt a post-structuralist or deconstructivist 
approach. It would seem axiomatic these accounts of law would reject any notion of a single 
best answer-based assessment. Paradoxically, it will be argued below that it is precisely this 
form of rule-scepticism which SQE1 does in fact embody. However, if one takes it for 
granted that some element of legal knowledge is both plausible and also a relevant part of 
legal education, such radical rejections4545 In fact, however, the “no right answer thesis” 
often in fact overplays its hand, failing to perceive in its own account of the operation of law 
that it locates “true” legal propositions within some other observable or otherwise knowable 
phenomenon, such as inchoate power structures, discourse, economics or single acts of 
adjudication based on subjective judgment. Some classical accounts of this nature can be 
found in Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of the Law” (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457; 
see also Duncan Kennedy and Karl E Klare, “A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies” (1984) 
94 The Yale Law Journal 461. A more genuinely “open” version of the no right answer thesis 
can be found in AD Woozley, “No Right Answer” (1979) 29 The Philosophical Quarterly 
(1950-) 25.View all notes of the possibility of such a thing are probably not a suitable starting 
point to enquire into their nature.
It is necessary to consider whether there is any plausible account of the truth conditions of 
legal propositions, which would be capable of being accommodated within both the 
contested nature of law, discussed above, and the form of assessment which the SRA is 
proposing.4646 For an excellent and original attempt to understand the relationship between 
law and truth, see Patterson (n 14). Patterson also examines the possibility that legal truth 
might be modal in nature, albeit in a different form to the account presented here.View all 
notes Such an account might fit within a legal coherence thesis, in which there is an agreed 
“way of knowing” whether a certain legal proposition is true, or a legal correspondence 
thesis, in which there exist knowable facts or states of affairs in the world, which would 
“validate” a legal proposition as true. Let us consider both possibilities.
For there to be a legal coherence account of truth, there would have to be an “immanent” 
quality to the law’s content, in that it would have to be found within the law itself. There exist 
numerous accounts of law of this type, often captured by the family resemblance concept of 
“legal formalism”.4747 For a survey of this concept see Morton J Horwitz, “The Rise of Legal 
Formalism” (1975) 19 The American Journal of Legal History 251.View all notes Such 
accounts of law see its operation as autonomous, somewhat scientific and as separate from 
the vagaries of politics and power, from which law is insulated by its formal nature.4848 Brian 
Leiter, “Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?” (2010) 16 Legal Theory 
111.View all notes For legal formalists of all stripes, it is the very nature of law (its “form”) 
which renders its content intelligible. There are two broad, and in many ways radically 
different, versions of legal formalism, each compelling in its way. On the one hand, there is 
the classical form of legal immanence found within the formalism of contemporary authors 
such as Weinrib,4949 Ernest J Weinrib, “Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of 
Law” (1987) 97 The Yale Law Journal 949.View all notes who explicitly see law as a matter 
of “coherence”, in which that “coherence functions as the criterion of truth”.5050 ibid 972.View 
all notes The answer to any legal problem will depend on the internal logic of the law in 
question, and ultimately the answer can be arrived at through a thought process which 
requires no recourse to any outside standards or non-legal judgment. Such approaches 
mirror influential accounts of authors such as Hohfeld5151 Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
“Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning” (1917) 26 The Yale Law 
Journal 710.View all notes who attempt to provide a logical framework for the structures of 
rights and duties which exist within the law. For such authors, law is entirely self-contained: a 
strong training in the rudiments of legal concepts leads to the potential solution to all legal 
problems in a near-scientific manner. While this might strike the reader as a circular form of 
argument, this is the very point of such accounts: they are axiomatic, just as mathematical 
truths are. Indeed, Weinrib himself embraces the argument of circularity, stating that it “is a 
consequence of the self-contained nature of intelligibility”.5252 Weinrib, “Legal Formalism” (n 
49) 974.View all notesSuch formalist accounts of law are almost exclusively focused on 
questions of private law,5353 Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (n 20).View all notes in which 
questions can be framed within the Aristotelian account of corrective justice, with its pseudo-
mathematical structures. On this view, questions of distributive justice, according to the 
celebrated Aristotelian dichotomy, lie outside law in the central formalist account.
A similar account of legal immanence is found within the interpretivist proto-natural law 
models of theorists such as Ronald Dworkin.5454 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 14).View all 
notes Dworkin rejects out of hand the brute “logic” of private law formalists such as Weinrib, 
and instead builds an account of internal legal reason which builds precisely on those 
elements of legal practice which would seem to disprove it. Much of Dworkin’s ingenious 
work focuses on the inability of the grounds of law alone to solve legal disputes, or lead 
directly to clear legal propositions: Dworkin argues that such problems demonstrate the 
inability of perceived legal rules of whatever genesis to resolve legal problems. For Dworkin, 
however, legal practice is characterised by the use of deeper legal “principles”,5555 Ronald 
Dworkin, “Hard Cases” (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 1057.View all notes to use the 
vernacular of his earlier work, which are, broadly, moral notions located within the legal 
system itself. In his later work, Dworkin comes to argue that these moral aspects of law are 
to be found through the interpretation of past legal practice (that is, previous legal decisions, 
legislation, etc.) in the light of their best moral justification.5656 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 
14).View all notes In this way, Dworkin also perceives law as an autonomous form of reason 
which possesses a form of immanence; in his later work he labels this law’s integrity,5757 ibid 
176–275.View all notes a near-synonym for coherence, with an additional moral connotation. 
While Dworkin sees law as a special form of institutionally bound moral 
reasoning,5858 Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press 2011) 400–
15.View all notes his account is one which can be classed as formalistic, in that it sees law, 
just as Weinrib does, as separate from politics, or as Dworkin’s celebrated early work would 
have it, “policy”.5959 Ronald M Dworkin, “The Model of Rules” (1967) 35 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 14.View all notes
If, therefore, either of these accounts, or some similar account, is correct, there is a certain 
viability in the MCQ-based approach of SQE1. On reflection, neither seems particularly 
plausible, and both seem far from the open and ecumenical nature of legal education 
discussed within this paper. The problem with formalist and immanent theories of legal 
knowledge is that they misunderstand the nature of legal reason in two important ways. 
Firstly, they put forward an account of law which is focused on one form of reason or 
argument which appears familiar to lawyers. In the two versions which we have examined 
here, these are the logical forms of reasoning based on the consequences of core legal 
concepts and the moral forms of reasoning based on the imaginative reinterpretation of the 
grounds of law. It is true that both of these forms of argument are indeed familiar to lawyers, 
and are indeed found within both the everyday practice of solicitors attempting to understand 
the law in front of them, and the detailed reasoning of an appellate judge. Such arguments, 
however, do not constitute the “end of the story” in any case. They are always part of a rich 
tapestry of competing modes of reason,6060 Patterson (n 14) 128–50; Philip Bobbitt, “Is Law 
Politics?” (1989) 41 Stanford Law Review 1233.View all notes some of which might be 
equally “formalist”, while others might be based on matters extrinsic to legal form, but 
nonetheless a recognisable part of legal argumentation. These might include historical 
accounts of past events, such as legislative intention or the evolution of the usage of the 
laws in question, or pragmatic or instrumental considerations, such as the consequences of 
a certain outcome. Accounts such as those of Weinrib and Dworkin are infinitely valuable 
because they help us to understand certain forms of reason which lawyers utilise in a 
legitimate way to reach legal conclusions. However, they tend to overstate their case 
because they fail to recognise that such accounts are in fact modal forms of reason, that is 
to say certain forms of qualifying argument, in order to add sophistication to legal 
thought.6161 In logic, a modality qualifies a statement or proposition in some way.View all 
notes While it is true that it is a powerful legal argument to point out that, from a certain point 
of view, or taking a certain modal approach, the logical correlative of a claim right in a certain 
area of private law is a duty on another party, such as Weinrib would have it, this would 
rarely if ever be seen as the end of the argument. On the contrary, other modes of argument 
intervene at this point, such as the moral interpretation discussed by Dworkin, or any other 
form of legal mode. Legal reason allows for different forms of qualifying proposition or 
statement to arrive at conclusions.
Secondly, and even more importantly, however, accounts of legal immanence 
misunderstand the nature of these arguments in a more fundamental manner. The various 
modes of argument which are used within law to take us from broadly agreed grounds of law 
to a valid legal conclusion, or legal truth, are not mechanistic in the way that formalists would 
have it. They are justificatory. The modality of legal reason is not an attempt to uncover in 
some clever way the deep truth lying within law. Instead, legal truth depends entirely on 
the use of legal modes to arrive at a given conclusion. Propositions of law are true because 
they are constructed through their justification by recognisably legal modes of argument. To 
point to a form of moral justification for a certain reinterpretation of established case law, for 
instance, is an attempt to justify a certain legal proposition through a certain form of modal 
reason comprehensible to lawyers, not simply an attempt to grapple with law’s immanence.
Concurrently, these two aspects (the modality and justificatoriness) of legal reasoning have 
a dramatic impact on the viability of SQE1 and MCQs more generally in assessing legal 
knowledge and the ability to “identify” legal truth. On the one hand, there is no single mode 
of legal reason: legal argument is multimodal. In the absence of a coherent account of 
legal metamodal reason, that is, how we negotiate between different forms of competing 
legal argument, the notion that an MCQ could capture this complexity is far-fetched, 
although not, it must be said, logically impossible. More significant, however, is the nature of 
the multimodal form of reason found within legal argument. Due to the justificatory nature of 
legal modes, there exists no bivalence within legal propositions. Legal propositions are not 
simply true or false in a simple way. The truth of any legal proposition will depend, in a very 
specific manner, on the multimodal reason which justifies it. Legal truth is 
ultimately constructivist in nature, in that it stems from the very modes of reason which are 
used to identify it. This modal constructivism entirely undermines the notion that legal 
propositions can possess bivalence. Arguments are only, at best, potentially true or false, 
when divorced from the modes which generate either outcome.
Before dismissing out of hand the SRA’s proposal however, it is necessary to consider the 
possibility that a correspondence form of truth might lie within SQE1’s account of law and 
offer an alternative plausible defence of the use of MCQs. Such would be the case if it could 
be argued that the truth of a legal proposition were clearly dependent on some external fact 
in the world. Numerous accounts of legal truth of this nature exist, ranging from efforts to 
locate legal content in the empirically observable social practices of a society6262 Hart (n 
4).View all notes to theories which seek to recast legal reason as some other form of truth or 
logic which can be identified outside law.6363 Posner (n 21); Finnis (n 16); Evgeny 
Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (Ink Links 1978).View all notes Such 
accounts avoid the hubris of accounts of legal immanence, but thereby exhibit another flaw: 
they reject entirely the notion of the autonomy of legal reason or knowledge, effectively 
making an assessment of the truth of a legal proposition dependent on something extrinsic 
to law. If one posits that “the law” simply is, to take some random but influential examples, 
the economically most efficient outcome, or the morally most appropriate conclusion, the 
very notion of legal truth becomes redundant. This is not to make any sort of argument 
related to the social locatedness of law or the complex relationship between law and other 
forms of thought or reason. However, the correspondence theory of truth would seem to 
have very little going for it in terms of an account of law which might justify SQE1. More 
fundamentally, even where such accounts of factors extrinsic to law enter into legal reason, 
which they of course do on a regular basis, they do so in the modal form described above. 
That is to say they do so as part of a multimodal justificatory form of reason which constructs 
a legal outcome. While an economic analysis of a question of liability in an appellate court 
might be influential in leading to a radical redrawing of an area of private law,6464 A classic 
example of this kind of thinking being present within judicial reasoning is Hunter v Canary 
Wharf [1997] UKHL 14.View all notes there is no sense in which a legal proposition is 
true simply by virtue of an analysis of Pareto efficiency in a particular transaction or area of 
economic activity for example. Such arguments, to the extent that they are part of the 
identification of legal truth are modal in nature and justificatory in function, i.e. from the 
perspective of such an argument, a particular proposition would seem justified. While 
extrinsic factors therefore come into legal reasoning, there is no sense in which the 
bivalence of legal propositions can be established through their correspondence or identity 
with something extrinsic to law. Of course, certain extrinsic facts in the world are often part of 
a process of establishing the validity of legal propositions in very obvious and central ways, 
such as the passing of a particular piece of legislation, or a previous judicial decision. 
However, these are grounds of law which might form the basis of a subsequent multimodal 
form of legal reasoning to take us from that ground to the legal proposition. While the 
modality of legal truth makes space for all manner of extrinsic “facts”, “events”, states of 
affairs and conclusions from other areas of knowledge, law cannot simply be reduced to 
those things. They need to be presented in the characteristic modal form of legal argument 
which then constructs the valid legal proposition.
What emerges from this discussion therefore is an account of legal truth which takes 
seriously both the idea that it is possible to assess someone’s ability to identify valid legal 
propositions, but which also accommodates the pluralistic, contested and complex nature of 
such questions. These aspects of legal knowledge are currently accommodated by the 
regulatory agnosticism which has long characterised legal education and training in England 
and Wales. What this section has sought to demonstrate is that while MCQs are certainly 
capable of testing knowledge in all manner of complex ways when that knowledge 
possesses some form of bivalence, this is not the case for legal knowledge. Legal 
knowledge incorporates the forms of knowledge and reason which are referred to in 
competing general accounts of law through its modes of argument: the success of these 
arguments leads to, or constructs, the validity or truth of a legal proposition. Law’s modal 
constructivism means that while things can be true or false to a greater extent in law, such 
matters are inseparable from the modes which justify them. Legal thought is therefore not 
merely constructivist but also justificatory. The modal and justificatory constructivism of law 
requires that a test of legal knowledge, such as that proposed in SQE1, be in the form 
of constructed responses, that is to say some means of allowing candidates to construct 
legal truths through the use of the multimodality of legal reason. This would allow for a 
greater distinction between candidates through their ability not only to demonstrate greater 
skill in these modes, but also to navigate the complexities of metamodal reasoning, where 
the modalities of legal truth conflict, which lawyers habitually refer to as hard cases. The 
notion that MCQs alone could allow for such sophistication of assessment is fanciful at best. 
The present discussion has not attempted to deal with what form of reason or argument 
characterises the clash of apparently incompatible legal modes; however, this is a major 
driver of the “doubt” referred to within the QAA Benchmark Statement, and the “deep 
learning” within the LETR. It must be emphasised that the present discussion is not 
attempting to argue that this deep learning or metamodal reasoning is somehow connected 
to academic legal study, or theoretical legal scholarship (although this is often a source of 
attempted resolution for such hard cases, referred to explicitly by appellate courts and 
referred to by practising solicitors). It is, on the contrary, a rather straightforward attempt to 
characterise the nature of legal truth from a practical perspective.
4. The Bleak Legal Realism of SQE1 and the role of lawyers
The preceding discussion is not a prescriptive one about the form of assessments within law 
in general or the appropriateness of a centralised examination in qualifying to become a 
practising lawyer. It is a measured and meditative attempt to underscore some of the often 
unstated reasons why the ecumenical approach towards legal learning has persisted within 
legal education and training within England and Wales. The “academic stage” of legal 
learning is valuable for many reasons, some of which will of course be retained by the 
“graduateness” requirement in the SRA’s envisaged changes. However, this academic stage 
has acted as a forum within which the multimodal nature of legal reason and truth could be 
learned and assessed in all manner of creative ways. Indeed, it is not even a logical 
consequence of the arguments presented here that MCQs be excluded from the summative 
assessment of legal knowledge. They must, however, be combined with elements of 
constructed response which allow for the multi- and metamodal arguments which justify the 
asserted propositions.
Without this justificatory modal framework, MCQs embody a very particular theory of law. 
Given what was argued previously regarding the lack of bivalence within legal propositions, 
in the absence of justificatory modes within the structure of assessment which render any 
answer “true” or “false”, all potential answers come to possess the “third” quality of 
propositions within formal and temporal logic: that is to say, not yet determined whether true 
or false. The selection of the answer is therefore a prediction: a prediction of someone else’s 
adjudication on such a legal matter. Of course, predictions can be extremely valuable in all 
forms of learning and professional practice, including within law. They can also form the 
basis of MCQs where this is their aim. One could for instance, have a multiple-choice exam 
regarding the outcome of a football match to take place in the future. When the football 
match concludes one would very objectively be able to calculate the candidate’s ability to 
predict its outcome. This is the account of law which SQE1 embodies. It is, in short, a form 
of Bleak Legal Realism, of the sort often pastiched by critics of legal realism in general. 
Legal realism of this kind, often labelled American Legal Realism, finds its roots in the 
celebrated work of Oliver Wendell Holmes6565 Holmes (n 45).View all notes and Karl 
Llewellyn,6666 Karl N Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study (Quid Pro 
Books 2012). The work of these American Legal Realists is in fact far more sophisticated 
than the pastiched version which is often presented. Legal Realism as a broader family of 
theories is of course an extremely nuanced account of the social function and locatedness of 
law and its operation.View all noteswhich takes as its starting point the idea that law is 
effectively inert regarding its eventual application due to the open-textured and indeterminate 
nature of legal sources such as rules and principles. It is, in short, a rejection of a 
romanticised vision of law of the type described in the preceding section as 
an immanent or formalist theory of law. However, rather than seek to locate the numerous 
justificatory modes which characterise legal argument, legal realism of the type in question 
seeks to find objectivity elsewhere, that is in the actual decisions made in the courts and 
empirical questions of adjudication more generally. Brian Leiter has more recently described 
legal realism’s impact as one of “naturalizing jurisprudence”,6767 Leiter (n 18).View all 
notes in that it makes the study of law and its content akin to the natural sciences, where 
hypotheses must be empirically tested. The upshot, for theorists who subscribe to the 
Holmesian account of law, is that any proposition of law can, at best, be seen as a prediction 
of an adjudicatory outcome. In this sense, through its lack of space for justificatory modes, 
SQE1 embodies such an account of law. It is a Bleak Legal Realism because it reduces and 
essentialises legal knowledge to a hunch about future actions of others, and permits no 
sophistication or justificatory argument which might temper this vision of law. Of course, in 
the MCQ itself, it is not the judge’s outcome which is being predicted, but rather the question 
setter’s. It is a form of legal realism without even the redeeming feature of being located 
within the empiricism of the social or natural sciences, and indeed law’s deep social 
situatedness.
This paper has attempted to present in a reasoned and informed manner the nature of legal 
truth and the validity of legal propositions. This is a fraught field, and it could be that the 
reader does not feel prepared to accompany the author all the way along his meanderings 
through modal, multimodal and metamodal reasoning, or through the justificatory modal 
constructivist account of legal knowledge. However, this account has been constructed here 
to make sense of a rather simpler proposition, that is that the exercise of a recognisably 
legal form of reason or argument is inherent within the practice of law, and, more particularly 
in the identification, articulation and application of valid legal propositions. The modal 
account given here attempts to accommodate the rather unambitious and hopefully 
uncontroversial claim that law’s nature cannot simply be reduced to something else which is 
easily knowable, nor to a form of logic. If this were the case, it would hardly seem 
appropriate to test legal knowledge among prospective lawyers rather than knowledge of 
that other thing or their ability to reason logically. The structure of SQE1 reduces law and the 
truth of legal propositions to the ability of a candidate to predict the application of legal 
thought by others.
Legal knowledge on this view becomes an instance of predictive justice. This is a curious 
time for prospective lawyers to be tested on this, at least in terms of their future job 
prospects, given that we are on the cusp of a revolution within the provision of legal services 
in which the predictive aspects of the legal profession will be far better carried out by artificial 
intelligence (AI) and algorithm than by human beings.6868 Richard Susskind, Tomorrow’s 
Lawyers: An Introduction to Your Future (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2017); Richard 
Susskind, The End of Lawyers? Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2010).View all notes This is precisely the type of task which AI excels at 
when compared to humans. While the development of AI’s role within law and legal services 
is a complex and potentially controversial matter, there is little chance that such aspects of 
the legal profession (effectively the parsing of reported previous legal events and identifying 
patterns to predict future outcomes) will not be effectively handed over to AI. Equally, 
however, there is a more worrying potential knock-on effect of the theory of law embedded 
within SQE1. If its advent has a more general impact on the nature of legal education and 
learning,6969 The author is not asserting that this is inevitablein any way. Universities, law 
firms and others are of course still “free” to set curricula as they see fit. Whether this 
happens under the proto-regulatory pressure of SQE is an example of a proposition in formal 
logic whose truth is yet to be determined.View all notes future lawyers will be trained to think 
about law in the bleak realist mode presented here. Due to the constructivist nature of law, 
as discussed in the previous section in relation to multimodality and its construction or 
creation of law through its justificatory nature, this will have a serious practical impact. One 
does not have to subscribe to the multimodal account of legal reasoning provided here to 
understand the force of this point. Law is constructivist in nature merely through its status as 
a social practice driven by the participants’ understanding of it: if the nature of that practice 
changes, by definition the law also changes. The inability of lawyers to reason in multimodal 
and justificatory ways, and indeed to express those forms of thought, will have a dramatic 
impact on the quality of lawyers, of legal services, and, eventually, the quality of the law. 
Perhaps the gatekeepers of the legal profession: judges, law firms, law schools, existing 
practitioners, various other stakeholders, and even the market for good quality legal 
services, will not allow this to happen. However, this would be despite an inappropriate form 
of assessment which fails to identify those candidates which are best able to construct valid 
legal propositions. The consequences of such a failure can only be empirically measured, 
and do not fall within the remit of the present work. However, an examination which fails in 
its attempt to differentiate between candidates’ ability to do the very thing which it is seeking 
to examine is unlikely to have its intended impact.
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